# 2NC DRR Round 5

## K

### Overview---2NC

### Framework---2NC

#### INTERP: The neg may fulfill its burden of rejoinder by disproving the desirability of the affirmative’s political ontology. That comes prior to evaluating plan implementation.

#### Prefer:

#### 1. EXPENDITURE: You should sidebar consequentialist analysis. Restricted economies arbitrarily limit the politics of labor to “possibility” when communicative acts provide you with the potential to radicalize expenditure in favor of unthinkable social arrangements.

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Joey Hornsby. “The work of the impossible: reading transgression through labour in Georges Bataille” King’s College, London. March 2021. https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/159766551/2021\_Hornsby\_Joey\_1275321\_ethesis.pdf

The idea of revolution as an event without cause or (planned) consequences raises questions of political and historical agency, and of precisely how revolution comes about. How do the circumstances that facilitate it fall into place, and what are we to do while awaiting them, if we cannot plan for them? These are questions that have been at stake for centuries of political revolutionary thought. There is, furthermore, the question of how we define political ‘revolution’. Bataille’s account as an abandonment of ends leaves the political spectrum wide open; this raises the issue of what is in fact at stake in the movement of the unproductive and the politics of the impossible. And the analogy between revolution and the gift, or the gift economy, raises its own questions; as Still points out, there is a kind of decidedly untransgressive ‘gifting’ or self-sacrifice latent in a market economy, in unpaid work, such as the kind of ‘women’s work’ we have previously discussed. That economy, then, incorporates an element of ‘female self-sacrifice’; we will need to disentangle how this labour sits within general economy, to establish whether that economy, like classical economic models, is flawed in assuming ‘a homogeneity of labour’.226 But, as she stipulates, there may still be positive aspects of gift-giving to valorise, and this jump into the dark of an anti-teleological, unproductive politics requires a willingness to accept future blindness which only the masses, confronted with what they have already lost, are willing to countenance. No real transformation is possible without this; we will remain always within the limits of the known and the possible.

The ultimate possibility of political transformation, Benjamin writes, expressed in the moment of Jetztzeit, is ‘redemption’. This word, insofar as it implies the settlement of a debt or the making good of a promise, might seem to bring us back to exchange, to Nietzsche’s petty slave bearing a grudge, wanting an eye for an eye. But for Benjamin, redemption bears no relation to the ‘closing of accounts’. It is, rather, about the total renewal, the transformation of the lion into innocent child, that would be brought about by a biblical, Messianic Second Coming. It is not about a return to a previous state of things, or achieving a state of equilibrium, nor is it a development of the present; it is the heralding of the absolutely new (and not its mere appearance).227 There is no possible righting of historical wrongs – the ‘shopkeeper’s scales of justice’, as Comay calls them, are beyond redress.228 The ‘wreckage’ the angel sees is irrevocable – for redemption to be fulfilled, that wreckage must be not corrected but entirely absolved, the scales must be destroyed.229

As Benjamin remarks in the Arcades Project, progress in the sense of actual change ‘has its seat not in the continuity of elapsing time but in its interferences – where the truly new makes itself felt for the first time, with the sobriety of dawn.’230 Progress, on Benjamin’s understanding, is not the ‘signature of historical process as a whole’ but the character of these transformative moments with which that whole is interspersed.231 Sovereignty and communication as per Bataille’s descriptions, if achieved on a collective, historical scale, might constitute just such moments. And indeed, the moment of ‘redemption’ could be read as the ultimate gratuitous moment of luxurious wastage, the entirety of human history spent and lost in society’s transformation. The subject of an impossible politics would be the subject committed to a present moment of sacrificial freedom, a moment which becomes impossible ‘dès qu’il est soucieux du temps à venir.’232 And communication might instigate a sovereign community of sacrifice, in which we would mutually embrace expenditure on the scale of the universe, transgressing the restricted economy of the individual which necessitates the compartmentalisation of persons as subjects (and objects) of exchange. In this sense, writes Besnier, the premise of the ‘revolutionary’ as something ‘political’ is in fact the pretext to something even grander, to ‘l’exaltation collective susceptible de cristalliser dans l’instant la continuité qui solidarise l’humanité’. 233 By collapsing the narrative limits of the project, labour and work, and setting in motion through the gift and sacrifice a mise en jeu of the self and the very boundaries through which social antagonisms are defined, expenditure as a political and economic principle of an ‘impossible’ politics might open the world up to new and previously unthinkable social and conceptual configurations, breaking open what Hollier calls the ‘monisme’ of rational thought.234

#### 2. ANXIETY DA: Internalizing their model deems epistemologies of mastery and domination as acceptable and desirable. Instead, eschew their limits on rejoinder.

Winnubst 7 – Professor of Philosophy at Southwestern University

Shannon Winnubst. “Bataille’s Queer Pleasures: The Universe as Spider or Spit.” *Reading Bataille now.* P88. ISBN: 0-253-34822-6

Another way of spinning this narrative is to say that Hegel submits the question of identity formation to the mastery of Reason. Negations, or limits, are internalized, made meaningful, made useful to the l: one engages negations and limits in order to know them. Again, Derrida's essay on Hegel and Bataille is helpful. As he describes it, in the Hegelian Aufhebung, "from infinite indetermination one passes to infinite determination, and this transition, produced by the anxiety of the infinite, continuously links meaning up to itself" (1 978, 275). The "anxiety of the infinite" here can be read as Hegel's deep anxiety of the meaningless, of that which resists all meaning— what Bataille might call the "formless," which thinking cannot think with- out turning it into some form. I Meaninglessness produces anxiety in this meaning-seeking thinker, just as it does in the culture that he articulates and we still inhabit. Meaninglessness demands the construction of limits, of boundaries, even of prohibitions. Thinking or experiencing limitlessly is untenable, useless, and unknowable; it is thereby also undesirable and, per- haps most troubling of all, it resists mastery.

Bataille's Queer Pleasures

The order of knowledge at stake in Bataille's turn toward general economies is thereby more far-reaching than any simple notion of utility or instrumental reason. Broader, more expansive contours of rationality may be at stake in his challenges to go "in the wrong direction on the paths of knowledge—to get off them" and find that "only unknowing is sovereign" (1991b, 208). To go in the wrong direction on the paths of knowledge may be to 14 challenge our very demarcation of concepts, our very act of categorization. While the attempts to find routes into general economies are appropriately numberless (and also unpredictable, shifting with historical conditions), those experiences which resist a reduction to a clear and distinct concept need not be read as defective or lacking in some fundamental way. Such experiences may challenge the very epistemologies that subtend such judgments, opening onto kinds of living that resist both these epistemologies of mastery and the politics of domination that they spawn.

#### 3. STATIC IDENTITIES DA: Communication over distinct political ontologies requires open analysis, not closed plan-focus. Refusing to problematize static identities in favor of “predictability” completely collapses community formations in favor of MSU’s egoism.

Dişci 20 – Asst. Prof. Dr. Kafkas Üniversitesi.

Zeliha Dişci. “Emancipation in Capitalist Society: Sovereignty as Renunciation and Expenditure in the Thought of George Bataille” Kilikya Journal of Philosophy, Year 2020, Volume , Issue 2, 92 - 109, 15.10.2020. https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/kilikya/issue/57313/812306

The experience of problematizing existence is sovereignty as revolt. The sovereign person violates the prohibitions of society. It does not serve the economy of meaning, the limited economy, and problematizes the present services. The rebellion begins when human undertakes to break them in favor of his own relatives, fellows. Riot as a refusal to submit to subjugation is a negation. (Bataille, 2015, s. 252) The rebellious is someone who has taken his share of sovereign glory and pushed the rebellion to its extreme limit. He freely reaches the world by self-conducting so as not to be a fool or a slave. The rebellion is the limit of what is possible. (Bataille, 1991a, s. 253) According to Bataille, sovereignty as going to the extreme/end is only possible with ignorance or unknowledge as the denial of another authority and his own becoming an authority. Rebellious reveals itself exactly by going towards the unknown, without deceiving. For Bataille, it is the unknown parts that reinforce slavery, provide great authority to God, or the experiment of poetry. But eventually, it requires an unknown, indivisible power. (Bataille, 2015, s. 27) The sovereignty that interrupts the given because it goes to the limit of what is possible is positioned on the outside of knowledge. Because knowing is always to try hard and to work. It is a slave-spirited action. Information is never sovereign, as it always moves again and starts all over again. (Bataille, 1991a, s. 202) However, we do not have the information on the sovereign moment. As soon as we know anything about it, the movement comes to a stopping point. (Bataille, 1991a, s. 202) Existential problems fall under the field of ignorance in the face of information that responds to the material needs of human life. Human being exists where knowledge ends. (Bataille, 2015, s. 8) The area of ignorance is the domain of sovereignty. Someone who knows before cannot go beyond a known horizon. (Bataille, 2015, s. 9) Thus, sovereignty as contacting with ignorance is to go beyond what is given. Sovereign has a world that extends the given world. One has this different world by pushing intellectual limits. (Bataille, 2011, s. 114)

The sovereignty that does not serve for knowledge, science, and dogma is an inner experience. Human encounters an extreme phenomenon in his ordinary daily life and gets clues about what his existence is. (Bataille, 2015, s. 7) In the inner experience, where all authorities are rejected, the experience itself is the authority. The experience is the problematization of given authority, the destruction of structures. The destruction of the structure is the emergence of non-perfect, the becoming visible of deficiency in human life. The assumed unity or fusion is what is destroyed at first. The experience in which unity is dissolved is only to exist, to get rid of deception and ties. (Bataille, 2015, s. 34)

For the inner experience, the discourse that represents knowledge must stop and silence is based on ignorance must begin. (Bataille, 2015, s. 12) The moment of sovereignty as an inner experience can only be achieved from the most internal motions. Sovereignty as an objection is the emancipation of the power of words. The life that does not go to the extreme and escapes from the end is a life without freedom. It is frozen, stable, and tidy. In this respect, religious, ascetic, or capitalist life is lacking in freedom. They are not a sovereign life. However, freedom is the possibility to reach the very end and the introduction of complementary or profitless action. Freedom for Bataille is not “the freedom of one class over the others, but the freedom of human life against the moral slavery”. (Bataille, 2000, s. 207) It is to go above and beyond the call of duty, that is, social slavery. The human that overcomes social slavery is different from the current human being. The daily human being becomes the same with only one part of human possibility. The human that overcomes the current human being is the whole person who has been freed from his slavery. (Bataille, 2000, s. 208)

Freedom requires a sudden and unpredictable break that cannot be accomplished by premeditation. (Bataille, 2014, s. 43) The amor fati which does not go to the border and submits to destiny is the enemy of freedom. Those who have the potential to go to the very end are the others that are reduced to the body excluded by the soul. The other fragments, distorts. It does not contemplate, it forces fate and goes to pieces. (Bataille, 2015, s. 63) Others, which are not visible from the plane of knowledge and soul, do not exist in this plane. But in reality, they are children, mad, etc. and exist within that plane. Those who are visible are adults, elders, etc. However, those who embody sovereignty are not adults but children, mad persons, and others in general. Because, for example, being a child is to go into extreme, holding the crazy tragedy, not the reality. (Bataille, 2015, s. 65) Sovereignty as going into the extreme becomes the limit experience. The limit is the edge of the world that human knows as human. The possibility of sovereignty is hidden at this point. Here, all knowledge and given bases collapse. The limit experience is deterioration and destruction of benefit, interest, domination and slavery relations between people. (Yalım, 2015, s. 55) In this respect, the limit experience is the experience of immanence. It does not cause satisfaction and does not turn into any information.

### Framework---AT: Fairness---2NC

#### 4. Affirming the general economy requires rejecting the proceduralization of fairness. Procedural fairness is a false conservative project to reject spontaneous community.

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Scott Cutler Shershow, “Of Sinking: Marxism and the "General" Economy.” *Critical Inquiry* , Spring, 2001, Vol. 27, No. 3 pp. 468-492 Published by: The University of Chicago Press. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1344217

The fifteenth edition of Paul Samuelson and William Nordhaus's fa- mous textbook Economics records a joke that allegedly was "frequently heard in Eastern Europe" after the fall of the iron curtain:

What is socialism? The longest road from capitalism to capitalism.40

This joke conveys precisely the spurious arcadianism with which classical and neoclassical economic theory grounds itself in the inevitability of homo oeconomicus and also the structure of displacement I have described in this paper, in which the restricted economy always reasserts itself out- side any effort to think a general economy. The joke's pointed illogic, which seeks to unbuild the very possibility of elsewhere, is the same illogic with which the archaic gift economy can be celebrated both for its irre- trievability and its inevitability. The ideologues of capital celebrate com- munity, in other words, precisely because capitalism is really the opposite of community-which it relegates, by means of this celebration, to a realm of discourse and theory impervious to all claims of the practical or politi- cal. In fact, capitalism locates itself explicitly outside of all previously ex- isting social bonds and requires a fundamental privatization of objects, spaces, and subjects. A familiar mode of corporate cant about teamwork in the workplace indicates, by contrast, the inviolable individualism of a system that assumes "free" agents meet as equals in the marketplace and exchange commodities, including human labor power, in the under- standing that the seller retains neither claim nor interest in the object sold. All of this is entirely familiar. And, of course, our nostalgic yearning for a gift economy that might have existed sometime, somewhere, finally reveals itself as a libidinal response to the atomization and crude eco- nomic calculation that represent the fundamental conditions of a capital- ist economy.

By contrast, as Jean-Luc Nancy has argued, Bataille's thinking of general economics was always inseparable from his thinking of commu- nity. Bataille also recognized, in Nancy's paraphrase, that the idea of com- munity "included, in spite of everything, themes of justice and equality" for "without these themes, regardless of the way one chooses to transcribe them, the communitarian enterprise can only be a farce" (IC, p. 20). One can thus pose here a version of the same question I raised above: In what sense could economic justice ever balance the (material) account without betraying its fundamental connection to the (theoretical) principle of bal- anced accounts? Attempts to relate the restricted and general economies seemingly always return to this dilemma: the necessary restrictedness in- volved in the project of justice (or, in the conventional sense, economics itself) apparently also requires, as its ground and vehicle, a restricted economy of knowledge-empiricism, rational choice, the enlightenment project in general. In other words, a commitment to fairness and equality in the mundane world of practical politics sometimes seems to demand that one reject a postmodern or "general" theoretical economy. Thus, from the Right, many writers today defend conservative disciplinary and intellectual values in the name of liberal notions of truth, justice, and the American way; and from the Left, Jameson identifies "late capitalism" as the very truth of postmodernism, its "cultural logic." The discourse conventionally known as economics, however, would here again relegate all such debates to a spiritual or intellectual sphere of experience that is accordingly sealed off from any real encounter with the practical. In the other sphere, where business is business, another version of the crucial relation between restricted and general economies suggests itself, as I described above. Here, a (spurious) general economy in the material world links itself to a (spurious) restricted economy of theory and knowl- edge. And precisely because these economies are spurious, this structure is always subject to a displacement where, as we have also seen, the eco- nomic restrictedness of material being (in other words, scarcity itself) al- ways seems to reassert itself.

### Framework---AT: Clash---2NC

#### 4. Closing down interrogation on the excess of the plan is dogma.

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Lindsay Lerman, “Georges Bataille’s “Nonknowledge” as Epistemic Expenditure: An Open Economy of Knowledge” The University of Guelph. 2015. https://atrium.lib.uoguelph.ca/server/api/core/bitstreams/989e2327-2403-40db-a529-1b527c99cd55/content

The applicable lesson of general economy and expenditure is this: Waste will occur regardless of the sophistication of the shoring-up techniques or methods. There is no perfectly closed or limited economy. That is, all production and acquisition of thought, and true belief or knowledge, is already part of—already caught up in—the movement of expenditure. Nonknowledge is a part of knowledge-creation, is a part of knowledge. Sothen, why not look at what we might be tempted to call waste, or strange and unreliable, or not in accordance with virtue, and see what we find? The four elements of nonknowledge seem wasteful, useless, frivolous, but they are not quite that. They function according to a “dual” utility. What can the dual utility show us that we might apply to the virtue epistemology conversation? Firstly, dual utility can show us that despite the existence of excess/epistemic expenditure/nonknowledge, the excess can and must be channeled. Secondly, dual utility can show us that recognizing and channeling excess or expenditure makes a robust “classical” utility possible. Whereas an attempt at “classical” utility, without the channeling of excess, will fall flat or be incomplete. This is because if Bataille is right, “classical” utility is an inaccurate description of the way an economy functions. Classical utility is a closed economy that does not recognize the waste that necessarily exists; an account of an economy driven by classical utility cannot see that it is in fact an open economy. We can see, then, how the dual utility of nonknowledge can be productive of knowledge in the context of our virtue epistemology conversation: An open economy of knowledge first sees the waste, and determines how some of it might be channeled, and this in turn serves the original, “classical” utility—all in the mode of dual utility. The key, however, is to see and use whatever can be used of the excess in a way that is not a refusal, and then a reluctant use, of waste. And it cannot just be an insistence that all waste be reinvested productively in utility.

Returning to limits and thresholds: Nonknowledge is by definition a movement of unending interrogation, so an end point of nonknowledge is not an end point but a temporary pause—a threshold: “I wanted experience to lead where it would, not to lead it to some end point given in advance. And I say at once that it leads to no harbor (but to a place of bewilderment, of nonsense). I wanted non-knowledge to be its principle” (IE 3). A pause—what looks like certain knowledge—is an opportunity to continue interrogation. “The final development of knowledge is that of interrogation. We cannot endlessly defer our response…to knowledge…Knowledge in the final degree lets go before the void. At the summit of knowledge, I no longer know anything, I succumb and I have vertigo” (Guilty 79; Kendall translation). The question, then, is: What do we see, in knowledge and in the virtue epistemology conversation in particular, when we “succumb and have vertigo”? What limits do we hit, and can we dissolve them? And then, after the fact, what can be said about what we’ve seen? We have to attempt an unsettling of philosophy in its roots, at its origin, and at its core:

Bataille asks Hegel (and we can presumably think he would have asked the same to Socrates): ‘why must there be what I know?’ (OC 5: 128/IE 109). This question also asks, why must there be that I know at all, including the fact that I may not know. Why am I even capable of thinking this thought and yet have no way out through thought to answer it? The ‘why’ begs an aetiology that exceeds the limits of epistemological inquiry. To put it bluntly, it asks, like a child does, for the reason things exist and for the necessity of one’s knowledge of them; understandingly, it partakes in the childish unsatisfaction of the ‘so what?’ So what if I know all this, when I do not know what I know it for, when I do not know why I know, and when I cannot think the wherefrom of my thought? Academic philosophy, having privileged questions concerning the ‘what’ as it now privileges the ‘how,’ grows often weary of this ‘why.’ The why ends up abandoned with childhood, or handed over to theology for better or for worse, dismissed as being naïve and irrelevant because it challenges the discursive modus operandi. Bataille’s insistence on ‘why’ brings about the désoeuvrement of the question itself as a mark of skepticism, a means toward a proof, or a rhetorical figure of philosophical authority. The question is no more the foundation behind a project of research; it is always posed in the beginning but from the end of research and the exhaustion of what cannot be answered. Hence, as if speaking for the first time, as if not returning to the scene of the Socratic trial, Bataille, using unattributed quotations, constantly responds to this question of knowledge, with the ‘I know nothing’ with which philosophy began (OC 5: 49, 62, 67, 73, 125/IE 37, 48, 53, 58, 106). However, all this would still be the mere comparison of a figure, if it did not reveal something about the movement of thought itself, namely, that the question for both Socrates and Bataille, being fundamentally the question of death, takes its authority not from philosophy, even if for Socrates philosophy forms its outer limit. The question takes its urgency from the unknown, and if the Socratic project conceals this impetus in the process, it also reveals it as the inception and the end (that is, also, the limit, the horizon) of philosophical practice, lest we forget that the question of mortality prompted Socrates to doubt the oracle and become a philosopher in the first place (Nikolopoulou The Obsessions of Georges Bataille 103-4).

This means we have to do what Socrates did: Begin thinking about knowledge from the position of nonknowledge—from the position of waste and excess—understood as encounter with our finitude. “Socrates began philosophizing from the excess of finitude he felt” at the “limit, the horizon of philosophical practice” (ibid 104). That is, we should back up or dig in, or whatever the metaphorical movement may be, and look closely at what we consider excessive or wasteful in the process of knowledge-creation. We see “strange and fleeting.” We see dreamlike states. We see ungrounded wonder. We see stupidity. We see uncertainty and unreliability. We see thought that is not motivated by love of truth. We see thoughts that we struggle to communicate, and that defy “the law of language.” We see irresponsible cognitive behavior—cognitive wandering without aim. We exceed epistemological inquiry and ask the childish, experimental questions. We play. Looking more specifically at the virtue epistemology conversation, we may look at the waste of non-virtuous beliefs (not motivated by love of truth), performances that fail to make use of cognitive character virtues to arrive at true belief, and strange and fleeting (or similarly non-virtuous) belief-production processes and see insight instead of waste. In this state, in these moments, we find something radical or heretical. (What if there is something to a hunch? What if a temporary impairment in cognition does allow us to think in novel and philosophically meaningful ways? What if placing restrictions on the creative conditions of knowledge prevents but does not improve or refine the creation of knowledge?) We cannot expect to be rewarded or credited for what we find. However, recall that while some experiences may occasion nonknowledge, they are not the form of nonknowledge. We cannot say exactly which experiences will be nonknowledge—and thus part of knowledge—and which will be entirely wild and incapable of grounding anything.

### AT: Albert---2NC

### Perm Do Both---2NC

#### 1. If we win framework, no perms. Rethinking economics is a prerequisite to ethical labor politics.

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Allan Stoekl. “Reflections on Acéphale” Religious Studies Review, vol. 48, issue 1. March 22. https://doi.org/10.1111/rsr.15740

The ethical issue is, then, to rethink economic systems in such a way that they provide for the safe expenditure of wealth that cannot be reincorporated within the system. The burn-off has to take place rationally, with a self-consciousness not available to Tibetan monks. And the rational burn-off is, ironically, fully irrational: it cannot be disguised as a practical contribution to God’s reign or to some political certainty. Today we could reframe the discussion and turn from the horrors of nuclear war to ecological degradation, global climate change, and so on. As with the nuclear buildup, the current ecological crisis—at least as scary as the prospect of nuclear war, if not more so—results not from “waste,” but from the inability properly to conceive of waste in a system that mandates continuous reinvestment and infinite growth. In such a system there will always be too much stuff, and since it cannot be reincorporated, or effectively reinvested, it will be “discarded,” thrown “away.” There is, however, no “away." The finitude is not simply of supply—solar energy in principle could replace fossil fuels—but of the system itself, which cannot reabsorb the unincorporable excess. The biosphere itself is limited, not just by the availability of resources, but by its ability to absorb the “waste” produced by the wrong kind of consumption. And the wrong kind of consumption (and economic system) ultimately will mean that resources are indeed limited, finite (as in the fossil fuel regime inseparable from capitalism), rather than in joyous overabundance. The finitude of resources, in other words, is largely a function of an economic system that cannot properly grasp the true nature of economic, and biological, excess.

This is a serious political project, but one not at all separable from the Acéphale “fad.” If equalizing wealth means that people just have a lot more stuff to “consume,” then the problem of the unrecognized or unrecognizable excess will remain unaddressed. Society will choke on ever more “waste.” For Bataille, the worker was not just the possessor of a “belly to fill”; he or she had (and was) an excess to burn off (1988, 190). Labor is not necessarily just about reinvestment and production: it is inseparable from idleness, from meditation, from erotic ritual. What does one meditate on? On that ultimate consumer of excess, and of oneself: death. Thus “joy before death,” the great subject of meditation of Bataille. One meditates on the radical finitude of one’s own will, of one’s being. One “sees” in contemplative practice that the larger transcendent goal—God, profit, social status defined through things, national greatness—is absent, that “above” all human activity there is no divinity, no purpose, no immortality, no knowledge that can justify or absolve. One meditates on this nothing, this rien, one incorporates it, and it is the absence of sense that keeps consumption from turning into a socially disastrous waste-production process. “Man will escape from his head like a condemned man escaping from prison,” as the Acéphale dictum has it. Put another way, Man escapes from “Man,” from the imperative to reside in a closed and permanent subjectivity defined by social domination (racism, sexism), the dead-end consumption of capitalism, and the mastery of nature characterized as “other” and as raw material. This death of Man, and of the God he invents and is justified by, is impossibly personified by that headless superman, by the Acéphale.

Just as in Acéphale, then, the project of The Accursed Share is a revolutionary, Nietzschean one, meant to “change the world.” Or (corny as it sounds) save it. The acephalous political conspiracy is not a joke; its reenactment on the scale of global politics is the greatest challenge “humanity” faces. Headlessness is the absence of control, the lack of an overweening subjectivity directing things to effect results, no doubt at a profit. “Progressive” politics as we know them today are all about wealth and prestige equalization—which is necessary, as far as it goes—but not about contesting the very notions of wealth/prestige that are taken for granted in modern societies by all political formations. Wealth cannot really be equalized unless there is some recognition of the fallacies of infinite investment and infinite returns, unless expenditure is reconceived under the sign of the (left-hand) sacred. The conspiracy does not entail an act of will. It is not just about moving wealth around, but rather it challenges the larger uses of wealth and the practices of expenditure. What’s at stake is a social transformation that goes well beyond simple equalization and contentment. The stakes are on the scale of the universe.

#### The aff mandates negotiations between employers and employees.

Leahy 18 – Judge, Appellate Court of Maryland.

Andrea Leahy, “Atkinson v. Anne Arundel Cty., 236 Md. App. 139,” Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 03-28-2018, No. 788, Lexis.

State labor law also supports the conception that employee health insurance benefits are considered a "term and condition of employment." At the time of Charter § 812's drafting and passage, the phrase "terms and conditions of employment" was already employed in the Maryland Code in the context of collective bargaining. [\*\*\*48] Title 3 of the State Personnel & Pensions Article provided certain State employees the right to bargain collectively—defined as "good faith negotiations by authorized representatives of employees and their employer with the intention of . . . reaching an agreement about wages, [\*174] hours, and other terms and conditions of employment[.]" Maryland Code (1993, 1997 Repl. Vol., 2002 Supp.), State Personnel & Pensions Article ("SP&P"), §§ 3-101, 3-301. See also SP&P § 3-502 (mandating that the matters to be negotiated "shall include all matters relating to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.") Interpreting SP&P § 3-502, the State Labor Relations Board has upheld an administrative law judge's opinion "that employee health insurance benefits are a mandatory subject of bargaining under [this collective bargaining statute]." In re: Md. State Emp. Union, Am. Fed'n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 92 v. Ehrlich, SLRB ULP Case No. 05-U-01, 2005 WL 6193427, \*1 (March 11, 2005); see also Md. Transp. Auth. v. Md. Transp. Auth. Police Lodge No. 34 of FOP, 420 Md. 141, 159, 21 A.3d 1098 (2011) (holding that an agreement by which officers received take-home vehicles from the State was a proper subject of collective bargaining under SP&P § 3-502 because it concerned wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment).

#### That makes the alt ontologically distinct, banning the plan.

Kerasovitis 23 – PhD student at the University of Wolverhampton. BSc (Hons)-MA.

Konstantinos Kerasovitis, „Necrolabour: A postqualitative contextualisation of contemporary work in respect to the philosophy of Georges Bataille” University of Wolverhampton. 2023. https://wlv.openrepository.com/server/api/core/bitstreams/97f4864a-341a-47c8-bc84-d3c98ede02e1/content

Ontological slide

What matters for Bataille is that work, by introducing division in the species— either seen as between employer/employee, or as in the master/slave dialectic— introduces dehumanisation. For as we have discussed, slavery exists only when we are confronted with slaves, things as property. An ontology that was not present now appears. This does not dehumanise only the labourer, but the master is also alienated from humanity. The master is liable to fall into thinghood: “even if he is still a man for others, he is now in a world where a man can be merely a thing” (AS1, p. 56).

#### 4. The alternative’s excess must exist outside contractualism, which means the perm links.

Thompson 97 – Senior Lecturer in Economics at the Open University, England.

Grahame Thompson, “Where goes economics and the economies?” *Economy and Society*, vol. 26, number 4. November 1997.

The first is a re-encounter with game theory and the now no longer so orthodox standard theory. To think the nature of networks as institutions, game-theory techniques can be used to explore the way co-operation and trust are established and sustained. However, these techniques suffer from a very real shortcoming from the point of view of convention theory (one, it must be said, that is not as often recognized by that theory as it should be). The analy- sis provided by game theory begins from a position of radical non-trust, non- cooperation and non-integration and asks how trust, co-operation and integration can be established and sustained. The problem that should be well recognized by convention theory is that this is the wrong analytical starting point. There is already some form of trust, co-operation and integration written into social life if it has any meaning and content. So the problem is not how to generate these from nothing but rather to ask how different forms of trust might be established, how agents or the system can be encouraged to become more trustworthy or trusting; and similarly with co-operation and integration. Strictly speaking, within the terms set by game theory this can be done only by hypothesizing a predisposition towards trust or cooperation on the part of agents to begin with, but this just displaces the problem on to some- thing else, which threatens to become tautological. So it is the question of where trust comes from that is still posed here. What might be the explanation for any such 'predisposition'?

This is where the second re-encounter arises. Potentially at least, the gift exchange may provide a site where further exploration of this issue could prove fruitful. There are a number of ways of talking about gift exchanges. To start with, a gift can be considered to render an obligation on the receiving party. It sets up a system of debt and repayment. Indeed, this is just the reason why this particular way of conducting the gift exchange discussion is disliked by the 'economy of excess' theorists. It brings back restricted economy notions (see below). Second, the gift can be seen as the 'excess' of an ordinary contractual exchange. If I contract you to do a task and agree to pay you a set amount for that task, then, if, as you complete it, you do it slightly better that I had anticipated (and had 'contracted' you to do), you are giving me a gift in the form of the excess quality of your output. Third, a gift does not just involve a present, it also involves a presence. There is something not exchanged in a gift, which has to do with what it does for the exchanging parties in a 'psychic' sense. It is part of the construction of the self, part of the formation of the subject. Fourth, and perhaps most radically, the giving of a genuine gift is in a sense an 'impossible act' precisely because it does involve an exchange, and therefore an obligation. If there is an obligation attached, then it is not a genuine 'gift'. Thus, to be a gift the gift must not be seen to be a gift, it must be disguised. Thus, although, of course, gifts are possible in one sense, it is the gift that is impossible. The gift in the singular cannot exist because of the problem of the reciprocity of a return of the gift.

What is being suggested here is that it is precisely in the context of these ideas about gift giving and receiving that the notion of trust is inscribed. Trust occupies the space vacated by the absent gift exchange. Perhaps we can generate that illusive quality 'trust' from a consideration of what goes on around the gift, be it in terms of 'obligation', 'excess', 'presence' or 'the impossible'. Perhaps?

#### 5. Fascism DA. Inclusion of the aff is a wounded attachment that guarantees fascistic alignment with the state.

Miller 22 – A philosopher of twentieth-century Continental thought with an emphasis on French metaphysics and politics in response to Fascism.

Patrick Miller, “What is Fascism Without a State?: Countering Claims of Bataille’s Left Fascism” *Critical Horizons: A Journal of Philosophy and Social Theory*. DOI: 10.1080/14409917.2022.2104082

Durkheim explicitly states that the sacred would be useless if the two realms cannot interact; however, this lack of relations is the raison d'être of Bataillean sacredness. Likewise, Durkheim describes the grounding of religion as a homogeneous group of heterogeneity that centres a constellation of concepts, beliefs, rites, et cetera.29 Bataille takes this idea and alters it. He explains that it is through wounds and tears in beings that new beings come to be.30 The sacred is the communication between beings that enables new beings. However, this new sacred is not reducible to a homogeneous whole, as this holism would undermine the very fragmentary nature of Bataillean sacredness. Bataille’s search for a new sacred is a search for a connection between beings that cannot be utilised. If the sacred congeals and a homogeneous system develops around it, then no collective “existence” is possible. The barriers against expenditure erected by homogeneous systems must be broken for connections of the heart and communities to form.31 This new connection must remain outside of the homogeneous realm and must not consolidate differences into a homogeneous whole, as happens in royal or authoritarian power. The result is a constant breaking of systems in order to develop a new sacred, in the form of relationships and communication between beings. This sacred is ephemeral by its nature, as homogeneous/profane society will want to restrict the sacred and co-opt it. So, while Durkheim was a major influence on Bataille’s terminology and sociological thought, there are significant changes that allow his philosophy to proffer social prescriptions. As such, any interpretation of Bataille’s thought that results in a solidified institution founded on a release of mob-like affectivity ignores his demand for ever evolving values that are not based on scientised values or facts.

One problem with these fascist readings of Bataille is their disregard for earlier pieces like “Le problème de l’État". In this piece, originally published in 1933, Bataille attacks statism in favour of a brand of anarchism. He identifies a historical trend of increasing constraint and domination by the state. This trend envelops all the dominant intellectual and political ideologies, including fascism and workers’ movements. Workers’ movements are linked to a war with the state, but, in the current situation, it is workers’ movements that are withering away. Simultaneously, totalitarianism draws on effervescent forces. Bataille summarises the historical situation: “The revolutionary consciousness that awakens in this world of constraint is thus led to consider itself historically as nonsense: it has become, to use the old formulas of Hegel, torn conscience and unhappy consciousness".32 The demand for revolt and the consciousness that promotes such revolutions are impotent in the modern political situation, and this impotence leads one to an alienated consciousness that is at odds with itself and the world. Constrained revolutionary spirit depends on optimism, yet the very nature of this consciousness is dependent on the system of production that created it. Consequently, this consciousness is torn from the beginning.

Bataille further explains this revolutionary affectivity as having no outlet except torn and unhappy consciousness. In misfortune one finds the painful affects in which neither God nor the master of the revolting workers lose their power. Now disbanded and left in disarray, the exploited class of workers is measured and compared to the power of gods—in the form of the homeland—and the most brutal master to exploit them, i.e. fascism. Meanwhile, despair also fuels the affective energy of revolution. Misfortune and exploitation in this historical moment leave the disaffected in a state of impotent rage. They are impotent insofar as they lack the means to alter the political structure; it is this very misery and frustration that stimulate collective affectivity.

Despair, according to Bataille, is the most powerful form of affectivity with the greatest dynamic value. Hence, despair represents the greatest hope of breaking from the current circumstances that put the theoretical ideals into question. Bataille explains, “The future does not rest on the minute efforts of some rallyers [rassembleurs] of incorrigible optimism: it depends entirely on general disorientation".33 As a result, one should not expect a collective of communists or liberals to challenge the impending threat of fascism; instead, the future depends on disorientation. Disorientation should be understood via the political situation at the time, the pincer of the fall of labour movements in pre-World War II Germany and the dominance of liberalism. For Bataille, disorientation is not certain. Even if contemporary theories and systems could explain the source of their inefficacies, they cannot go beyond themselves or further toward disorientation. Those who speak or fight against fascism may begin to understand that their formulas and theories are juvenile. As Michel Surya summarises it, “In short, nothing was to be expected of anyone who did not make hatred of the state a motive to carry the heartbreak further and deepen the misfortune, nothing was to be expected of anyone who did not desire ‘generalised disorientation.’.”34 One will fall back into the old state apparatus if one does not go further. Bataille perceives this falling back of violent uprisings as having already occurred three times, in the Russian Revolution, the birth of Nazism, and the formation of Italian fascism. In many ways, this falling back mirrors what Bataille would expound in “The Psychological Structure of Fascism”: old structures reinforcing themselves after upheaval, instead of allowing a perversion of the status quo because of intuitional familiarity.35

#### 6. Impossibility DA. Revolutionary politics must stand alone in its possibility.

Hornsby 21 – Research Student working towards a PhD in Philosophy at the King’s College, London.

Joey Hornsby. “The work of the impossible: reading transgression through labour in Georges Bataille” King’s College, London. March 2021. https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/159766551/2021\_Hornsby\_Joey\_1275321\_ethesis.pdf

Human life, then, if it is to achieve sovereign form, ‘ne put en aucun cas être limitée aux systèmes fermés qui lui sont assignés dans des conceptions raisonnables’. In fact, it begins in the very deficiencies and lacks of those systems.211 This is where the logic of labour, exchange and utility is broken open; where the narrative of the ‘project’ ceases to make sense. This is a narrative we read as expressed through teleology and progression; life would thus begin in the moment where teleological narrative is exceeded, in which the ‘conduites utiles’ of a self-justfying, rational system of development are shown to be without value, insufficient next to the rupturing power of ‘conduites glorieuses’. 212 And in light of the context we discussed above, of class struggle and community, it is easy to see how this rupture could be understood as political. Bataille writes in La Notion de dépense that in an opening out to the generosity of expenditure and the sovereignty of the don de soi, there is the possibility for class struggle to shake off its perverted, agonistic form and become instead ‘la forme la plus grandiose de la dépense sociale’. 213 If the energy directed towards sustaining class separation can be taken up and ‘wasted’ in the glorious act of revolution by the oppressed, that revolution can embody an ‘impossible politics’, threatening reason itself as a principle, and the very existence of the masters who sustain ‘rational’ order.214 But to do so, this revolution must, like the gift or sacrifice, exist in and for itself, and leave the question of what comes next unanswered. As opposed to the logic of progression, which must sustain an inner continuity and consistency for the narrative of development to hold, the gift or sacrifice, as a confrontation with the absolute absence of knowledge and an absolute openness of (im)possibility, might be narratively expressed as the word, thing, or moment that stands absolutely by itself. This would neither be the natural end of its predecessor, nor the servile means to what will follow, acting as the interruption of the logic of both.

### Perm Non-ME---2NC

#### And, it severs strengthen. It must be a net increase.

Marian B. Horn 03, JD, Judge, United States Court of Federal Claims, Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisconsin & Subsidiaries v. United States, United States Court of Federal Claims, No. 98–727T, 06/12/2003, Westlaw. [italics in original]

On the basis of this regulation, the Supreme Court concluded that: “In short, any net additions to reserves (with two exceptions not here at issue, § 1.846–3(c)(3)(ii)) constitute ‘reserve strengthening[.]’ ”17 *Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm'r*, 523 U.S. at 386, 118 S.Ct. 1413. The Court held that the Treasury regulation “represents a reasonable interpretation of the term ‘reserve strengthening[.]’ ” *Id*. at 391, 118 S.Ct. 1413.

Therefore, the ambiguity in the term “reserve strengthening” has been resolved by the Supreme Court, which found that “reserve strengthening” is defined as any net additions to reserves. The words of § 1.846–3 indicate that reserve weakening is merely the converse of reserve strengthening; when strengthening is mentioned in the regulation, it is immediately followed by the word, “weakening,” in parentheses. The term, “reserve weakening,” therefore, logically refers to any net reductions in reserves.

The plaintiff, however, argues that the term, “reserve strengthening,” at issue in *Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue* actually referred to a different provision, TRA § 1023(e)(3)(B), not the reserve weakening provision at issue here, TRA § 1012(c)(3)(C): “[d]efendant's argument is based on the definition of the term ‘reserve strengthening’ in TRA § 1023(e)(3)(B), as implemented by Treas. Reg. § 1.846–3(c). Defendant assumes, without analysis, that Treas. Reg. § 1.846–3(c) can be used to interpret the term ‘reserve weakening’ under TRA § 1012(c)(3)(C).” While it is true that § 1.846–3(c) does not explicitly refer to TRA § 1012(c)(3)(C), there is no evidence to suggest that the IRS intended reserve weakening to mean one thing in one part of the statute (TRA § 1023(e)(3)(B)), and something else in another part of the same statute (TRA § 1012(c)(3)(C)).18

\*710 This court, therefore, concludes that, in the context of TRA § 1012(c)(3)(C), “reserve weakening” is defined as a decrease in reserves. The Supreme Court's decision in *Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue*, the words of § 1.846–3, and logic dictate that reserve weakening is defined as any net reductions in loss reserves.

Given the definition of reserve weakening as any net reductions in reserves, the next question to be addressed is, whether reserve weakening actually occurred in this case, so as to require resort to TRA § 1012(c)(3)(C) in the first place. The defendant contends that BCW's unpaid loss reserve was “strengthened,” not weakened, in the amount of $2,833,129.00 by the end of 1986. Indeed, the “Addendum to the Report of the Examination of Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, As of June 30, 1986, by Office of the Commissioner of Insurance, State of Wisconsin,” supports defendant's position. The Addendum is entitled: “Statement Of Assets, Liabilities, Reserves and Unasigned [sic] Funds per the December 31, 1986 Annual Statement.” The first entry under “Liabilities” is “Claims unpaid,” which refers to the loss reserve for incurred-but-not-paid claims. According to the statement, the claims unpaid as of December 31, 1985 was $75,588,265.00, while the claims unpaid as of December 31, 1986 was $78,421,394.00. The claims unpaid figure for 1986 was larger than that for 1985; BCW reported “reserve strengthening,” as opposed to reserve weakening, in the amount of $2,833,129.00 at the end of 1986.19

#### Especially true for ‘rights.’

Laurence R. Helfer & Dr. Karen J. Alter 14, JD, Professor, Law, Duke University; PhD, Professor, Political Science & Law, Northwestern University. #gocats, "The Influence of the Andean Intellectual Property Regime on Access to Medicines in Latin America," in Balancing Wealth & Health: Global Administrative Law & the Battle Over Intellectual Property & Access to Medicines in Latin America, Chapter 9, pg. 1-13, 03/13/2014, Brill.

In response, domestic generic drug producers successfully lobbied lawyers at the Andean General Secretariat to file a noncompliance suit against Ecuador alleging that the pipeline decree violated the absolute novelty requirement Andean Decision 344, which regulated patents and trademarks. Ecuador defended the domestic decree as consistent with a provision of the Decision authorizing members to adopt domestic legislation or international agreements that “strengthen the industrial property rights” (Andean Decision 344, Article 143 (1993)). The General Secretariat countered that the decree contradicted an unambiguous restriction in Andean patent rules and created an incentive for foreign firms to seek pharmaceutical patents in Ecuador but not in other member states. In a judgment issued in 1996, the ATJ sided with the Secretariat. The Tribunal interpreted the word “strengthen” in a teleological fashion, reasoning that national laws and treaties must complement the regional IP system, not contradict it. Ecuador had thus violated Andean IP law “by establishing an exceptional regime . . . granting advantages to patenting in its own country, in a manner that was unfair under the common regime applied in the other Andean countries” (Manrique, 1998, at 217). The ATK also categorically rejected Ecuador’s claim that “an international commitment [could] be invoked as a reason to validate noncompliance with a prior Community obligation” (Case 1–AI–96 (Oct. 30, 1996), at 30).

### AT: 1AC is K---2AC

#### AND federal labor law renders the state an employer which restricts the self to a citizen-worker.

Kerasovitis 23 – PhD student at the University of Wolverhampton. BSc (Hons)-MA.

Konstantinos Kerasovitis, “Necrolabour: A postqualitative contextualisation of contemporary work in respect to the philosophy of Georges Bataille” University of Wolverhampton. 2023. https://wlv.openrepository.com/server/api/core/bitstreams/97f4864a-341a-47c8-bc84-d3c98ede02e1/content

The self becomes a product to be sold to the potential employer, making unemployment the enterprise of selling the self, as this self is defined by the other.

The State as Factory: Conditionality

Akin to the blurring of the divide between worker and unemployed, there is also a blurring of the divide between state and business. This is most evident in the gradual transformation of the state, from regulator of business, to a business in itself, by the adoption of the New Public Management (NPM) model (Hood, 1991). The subsequent operation of the public sector as a business inherently carries the notions of accountability, measured performance, and competition (Kernaghan, 2000). The services of the state can now be outsourced to the private.

This is indicative of the wider transformation occurring in the nature of the social state. A transformation felt more intensely in the move from passive to active labour market policies (PLMPs and ALMPs, respectively). From income support that does not depend on conditions, to policies that provide support paired with incentives and sanctions (Pissarides, 2011). What is referred to as welfare conditionality, effectively positioning the state as provisor of “public support for private responsibility” (Gilbert, 2015, p. 3).

Welfare conditionality repeats the regard of the world by fiat we earlier encountered in the factory, in the fact that besides the numerous reports (Gielen and Ours, 2014; ESRC, 2018; Dwyer et al., 2020) pointing to its utter ineffectiveness; more actively seeking a job does not make any difference in a market that has no work to offer. Conditionality consistently considers unemployment as an individual failing and not a structural phenomenon.85

The end goal of conditionality seems to be the instalment of a relationship of subordination between citizen and state, not unlike those between employer and employee, master and slave. The worker-citizen is responsible for adhering to the standards of the other.

Support as a right is not on the agenda. A fact which has had a corrosive effect on the very nature of the job of those who are called to enforce conditionality within the state social services: the employment consultants. The very people that form the point of contact between state and unemployed citizen. Consultants are not called upon to act as aides, as the human face of a “feeling state” (Cooper, 2011, p. 3), but now emerge as punishers (see Penz et al., 2017). As managers in the state-factory, they too are workers, and are threatened with sanctions. There is a quantitative demand for measurable efficiency, which makes their work goal “the fulfilment of the performance indicators” (vice managing Director of Vienna’s unemployment services quoted in Penz et al., 2017, p. 550), and not the provision of support.

### AT: Sustainability---2NC

### AT: Private Fiat---2NC

### AT: Science DA---2NC

#### It empowers Trumpian cronies which turns every impact.

Russell **Muirhead &** Nancy L. **Rosenblum 25**, Muirhead is the Robert Clements Professor of Democracy and Politics at Dartmouth College; Rosenblum is the Senator Joseph Clark Professor of Ethics in Politics and Government Emerita at Harvard University, "Trump and the Perils of Ungoverning: Institutions Under Assault Will Not Deliver for Americans," Foreign Affairs, 1/23/2025, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/trump-and-perils-ungoverning

As U.S. President Donald Trump returns to the White House, it already seems clear that his second term will look little like his first. Many of Trump’s first-term appointments distanced themselves from his views and even denounced him. “I picked some people I shouldn’t have picked,” Trump lamented on Joe Rogan’s podcast last November. “Disloyal people.” This time, Trump is ready. The president and his allies are convinced that he was let down in his first term by those around him and by the bureaucracy of the federal government. They will not let that happen again.

On his first day in office, Trump restored Schedule F, an employment category that he had created in the closing months of his first term that strips civil servants of protections, allowing them to be fired at will. Trump has convinced many of his followers that a “deep state” thwarted his first term and robbed him of the 2020 election. Now, the putative deep state will be expunged, along with the expertise and procedures that make effective administration possible. Trump will judge both appointees and civil servants by one criterion: loyalty, defined not by commitment to a programmatic agenda but by unquestioning obedience to the president.

According to reporting by The New York Times, the administration’s transition team has been asking applicants for government posts in multiple agencies, including in the intelligence services and the Department of Defense, about their views on the events of the January 6 attacks on the U.S. Capitol. And they have asked applicants pointedly about the 2020 presidential election. Those who condemn the attack or believe that Biden won the race appear unlikely to receive posts.

Staffing the federal government with sycophants is not about ensuring loyalty to an agenda. It is about ensuring submission to the president. And it serves to amplify what we call “ungoverning”: the degradation of state capacity and the substitution of unchecked personal will for the difficult, necessary business of shaping, implementing, and assessing policy for the nation. The administration will sideline experts and circumvent regular processes of information gathering and consultation. In so doing, it will degrade state capacity; the premium Trump places on personal loyalty will result in confounding his ability to govern.

Ungoverning is radical and rare in the annals of political history. There are simply not that many examples of states that have been systematically degraded and dismantled by individual rulers or parties. In some cases, those in power manage to substitute kleptocracy and state violence for administration; for instance, in Venezuela, where first Hugo Chávez and then Nicolás Maduro destroyed a prosperous and functioning state.

In the United States, ungoverning—which is distinct from conservative small government and from deregulation and privatization—is novel. Critics on both sides of the aisle have tried to cut through bureaucratic red tape in the past, but historically, officials of both parties and the general public have accepted the administrative state as indispensable to the fulfillment of public needs.

The question now is whether those around Trump will work to check his appetite for ungoverning. As subject-specific experts are replaced by flatterers, the government’s ability to achieve lasting, large-scale results shrinks. As process is shunted aside in favor of one person’s will, the state’s ability to gather accurate information and make effective judgments corrodes; its capacity to design, refine, and implement policy disappears. Ultimately, ungoverning makes the strongman weak.

LOYALTY OVER CAPABILITY

At the heart of democratic governance—and the office of the presidency—is the idea of administration. The institutions and scope of the current administrative state can be traced to the New Deal era of President Franklin Roosevelt. But the importance of building a state with administrative capacity goes back to the country’s founding. When opponents of the Constitution insisted that state governments would be closer to the people—and more loved by them—than any government operating on a national scale, Alexander Hamilton, the first secretary of the treasury, responded that the aim of the government was not to reflect the passions of local majorities but to practice good administration.

A state with administrative capacity pursues its goals by first systematically and accurately gathering information on current conditions—as Hamilton tried to do on the national economy in his 1791 “Report on Manufactures” and as the Bureau of Labor Statistics and every other agency does now. The next step is to envision a future that is more prosperous, freer, and more secure. And, finally, to design a plan for applying resources, on a large scale and over a long period, to bring that future into being. The administrative state shapes, implements, and enforces every law passed by Congress and every executive order made by the president. As Hamilton wrote in Federalist, no. 72 (of The Federalist Papers), “the administration of government, in the largest sense, comprehends all the operations of the body politic.”

The machinery of government that Trump now inherits comprises about 4,000 political appointees and three million public servants who respond to natural disasters and military emergencies, pursue long-term goals set by Congress and the president, and do much else. For Trump, the problem with expertise and process is that they limit the scope and constrain the exercise of his power. Specialized knowledge is a source of authority, as Trump knows, which is why he cannot bear to stand alongside a knowledgeable official, even one of his own appointees, without asserting his own superior expertise. At a press briefing during the COVID-19 pandemic, he suggested to Deborah Birx, the White House coronavirus response coordinator, that irradiating COVID-19 patients’ bodies with ultraviolet light and injections of disinfectant might offer a cure. “I’m not a doctor,” the president said, pointing to his head. “But I’m a person that has a good you-know-what.”

Trump expects that selecting for loyalty will allow him to govern more effectively in the second term, to push through his agenda. But in truth, prioritizing loyalty over capability will undermine his administration. Unless he is able to yield to the expertise of his appointees and civil servants, his own policy aims will be frustrated. Trump’s problem is not that he requires loyalty to his agenda, on tariffs, on immigration, on foreign policy. It is that he demands personal loyalty—or what John Bolton, Trump’s longest-serving national security adviser in his first term, has called “fealty, a medieval concept implying not mere loyalty but submission.”

ADMINISTRATION DEGRADATION

To be sure, some of Trump’s cabinet picks are loyal primarily to his program. Take his new border czar, Tom Homan, a former border patrol agent who served as head of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement deportation branch under President Barack Obama and acting director of the agency under Trump. “I’ve seen hundreds of policies come and go,” he told The Wall Street Journal earlier this month. “I know what policies worked and what policies don’t work.” He is devoted to Trump’s immigration policies, but he has also met with Republican members of Congress to moderate expectations about the practicality of mass deportation. For those who support Trump’s policies, this is the kind of appointment that promises to convert Trump’s rhetoric into reality. For those who oppose Trump’s policies, this is what makes Trump’s second term more foreboding than the first.

An effective president has to find and empower people in the mold of Homan—professionals with deep expertise capable of translating broad goals into workable policies and implementing them. This is what “administration” means. But Trump’s insistence on personal submission, and his distrust of the very administrative state he is charged with directing, is decidedly anti-administration. As Russell Vought, the prospective director of the Office of Management and Budget, has said: “We want the bureaucrats to be traumatically affected. When they wake up in the morning, we want them to not want to go to work because they are increasingly viewed as the villains.” This is also the orientation of Kash Patel, Trump’s nominee to head the FBI who last September promised to close the agency’s Washington headquarters and convert it into a museum of the “deep state.”

Then there’s the so-called Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE—helmed by the political newcomer Elon Musk. The electric car and spaceship mogul originally promised to cut at least $2 trillion from a federal budget of nearly $7 trillion, to lay off two million federal employees, and to slash thousands of regulations. To shrink the budget, civil service, and regulatory scope of government on this scale is an enormous task, and DOGE has recruited leaders from Silicon Valley to develop the plan. Staffed mostly by individuals with little or no experience in governance, DOGE will be unlikely to realize the massive restriction in the scope of the federal government that its founders promise. To do so would require both intimate knowledge of the federal budget, the work of federal agencies, and buy-in from a working coalition of legislators, not to mention the backing of the American public that may not be ready to accept a government that does vastly less than people are accustomed to.

If Trump is to succeed in realizing the policies he espouses, his administration will need to make appointments on the basis of qualities more salient to effective governance than personal loyalty. Effective governance requires empowering public servants with experience and specialized knowledge. It means allowing for a process by which they can form and select from alternative policy options, detail plans for their implementation, and then act on those plans. It means staying true to clear goals so that appointees can advance the agenda without squandering time and talent kowtowing to the president.

Those who oppose Trump’s policies may welcome a chaotic anti-administration that cannot make good on the promise of mass deportation or across-the-board tariffs. But Trump will not oversee an administration that is simply ineffective. Rather he will orchestrate a comprehensive degradation of the administrative institutions of government—the processes of decision-making and the consultation of expertise that effective policy of any sort requires. Instead of a government capable of policymaking and implementation, the U.S. government will revolve around the personal will of the president.

Governing is not about domination and submission. As Hamilton observed, it is about undertaking “extensive and arduous enterprises for the public benefit, requiring considerable time to mature.” The Biden administration aspired to this, as exemplified by the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and the CHIPS and Science Act, both of which are massive, long-term projects that will take a generation to reveal their full effects. If Trump harbors similar or grander aspirations, his administration will likewise need to act like an administration.

### AT: Geoeconomics DA---2NC

#### The alt solves growth better. It boosts productivity, but in a way that’s sustainable.

Yang 00 – Ph.D., Anthropology, University of California at Berkeley, Professor of EALCS & Religious Studies Departments.

Mayfair Mei‐hui Yang, “Putting Global Capitalism in Its Place: Economic Hybridity, Bataille, and Ritual Expenditure” *Current Anthropology*, Volume 41, Number 4, August/October 2000. https://doi.org/10.1086/317380

In a discussion of Bataille on sacrifice, Baudrillard pointed out that Bataille misread Mauss: for Mauss there was no unilateral gift which did not ask for response. Just as for the Aztecs human sacrifice of blood to the god was the nourishing of the sun in order that it shine, there is no pure principle of expenditure governing the cosmic field of life forces but only an interrelated process of challenge and response (Baudrillard 1998:193). Similarly, destruction and expenditure are always “the inverse figure of production,” so that, “in order to destroy, it is first necessary to have produced” (p. 195). Far from preventing production as modernization theory would have it, a ritual economy can actually spur production. This can be seen in how successful Kwakwa̱ka̱’wakw participation in trade and wage labor in the Western capitalist economy actually introduced new wealth for the rapid expansion of potlatches (Codere 1950). Similarly, rural Wenzhou people’s yearning to reconnect with powerful realms of the sacred through ritual excess and transgression has actually fueled the drive to produce and acquire wealth. In both these historical experiences, we have witnessed a process of the hybridization of economies in which what appears on the surface to be a concession to or imposition of capitalist development is actually the reverse penetration of capitalism by alien principles of ritual economies. These are instances in which a market economy has unleashed or reactivated the principle of exuberant community ritual display and consumption and the revived ritual economy has helped to launch economic production while also inflecting the process toward its own ends. To grasp this historical process in all its complexity, we must deconstruct the monolithic notion of a cohesive capitalism and move toward a notion of capitalism as an open‐ended, mutating process made up of disparate and conflicting elements, some of which harbor the potential to derail its forces and harness them in new directions. The notion of economic hybridity here does not presuppose a single preordained direction for the economy, but it does suggest that theoretical reflection and discursive practice may yet be a factor in the historical direction that an assembly of economies may take.

#### That orientation is best. Their defenses of growth assume perfect economy rationality, which we’re critiquing. Instead, embrace wombat ethics and gift-giving.

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Joey Hornsby. “The work of the impossible: reading transgression through labour in Georges Bataille” King’s College, London. March 2021. https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/159766551/2021\_Hornsby\_Joey\_1275321\_ethesis.pdf

How, then, are we to enact the bona fide luxury and sacrifice that could deconstruct the boundaries enforced through class and labour? How does one conduct class struggle without falling back into the antagonistic, alienating pursuit of distinction from one’s peers? How are we to embody sovereignty and sacrificial loss, and what would this embodiment oppose to the narrative of history and the project? This act would undo the insistence on ‘just exchange’ that pervades consciousness under capitalism, Nietzsche’s retentive ‘closing of accounts’, but it would also exceed the structural boundaries implied by a logic of progression. For Bataille, this undoing lies in the gift as a sacrificial loss of resource which stands in contrast to measured exchange, the theory of which he develops out of Marcel Mauss’s analysis of the potlatch. A potlatch is a gift giving feast that was and still is practiced by some North American indigenous peoples, but was used by Mauss to refer to a practice of ‘prestation totale’ he attributed to a wide range of so-called ‘primitive’ societies, a set of gift-exchange practices with economic, social and political implications.186 In giftgiving, rather than a law of equivalent commercial exchange based on monetary wealth, there is a system ‘de droits et de devoirs de consommer et de rendre’ which corresponds to ‘des droits et des devoirs de presenter et de recevoir’, through which spiritual and social bonds and boundaries are affirmed and reaffirmed.187

Again, like sacrifice, gift-giving practices are historically enmeshed in economically hierarchical productive structures. The North American potlatch, for example, hosted by wealthy families, can be very plausibly read as an act of class struggle as an ‘acte agonistique de séparation’. 188 The wealthy, whose material possessions are products of the labours of their subjects, reinforce their status (and therefore their future potential wealth) through the quantity of loss they are able to publicly embrace; this loss is therefore no such thing, performed as it is in the name of social capital and prestige. One competes with rivals from the same economic strata by humiliating them with relatively superior generosity, and re-establishes the distance between bottom and top:

Dans le potlatch, l’homme riche distribue des produits que lui fournissent d’autres hommes misérables. Il cherche à s’élever au-dessus d’un rival riche comme lui, mais le dernier degré d’élévation envisagé n’a pas de but plus necessaire que de l’éloigner advantage de la nature des hommes misérables.’189

Potlatch, as Leslie Hill puts it, ‘already partakes of the economics of acquisition, circulation, production.’ Indeed, Hill argues that in his very description of potlatch as ‘prestation’, Mauss defines it in the terms of exchange, and not those of destruction.190 However, for Bataille the potlatch nonetheless makes visible the possibility of a movement of which the motor is at least partly loss, rather than acquisition; wealth is stockpiled in order to be spent, as opposed to the commercial capitalist model where any expenditure must be justified by its contribution to growth. As Still puts it, gift economies show the non-universality of the ‘dominant market paradigm’.191 In the gift economy, according to Bataille, production and acquisition are still in a sense secondary to expenditure, because gift-exchange is still treated as ‘une perte somptuaire des objets cédés’. It is not rendered as an acquisitory process, but one of competitive generosity. As Bataille sketches it in La Notion de dépense:

La valeur d’échange du don résulte du fait que le donataire, pour effacer l’humiliation et relever le défi, doit satisfaire à l’obligation, contractée par lui lors de l’acceptation, de répondre ultérieurement par un don plus important, c’est-à-dire de rendre avec usure.192

As an act of expenditure, each gift or sacrificial act is its own end as well as taking part in that exchange. The actual gift stands by itself; the exchange arises from the givers being always at the mercy of the stakes being raised again, of the last gift being answered. This is an economy in which financial utility is not the ruling principle, operating a principle of prestige that is produced in waste.

Returning to the subject of chronology and temporality, the aspect of loss and the question mark over whether the stakes will be raised again point to precisely that element of risk we have seen as absent in the narrative of labour and production. As Hill points out with his reference to the ‘general equivalent’ of exchange, gift-giving lacks the assurance of a third term, a gold standard guaranteeing balance of value. But the risk of uneven return goes beyond the question of value to the very fact of continuation itself. While gift-giving as a ritual is structured on an expectation of return, this expectation is nonetheless just that, a social convention; it lacks the apparent rigour of commercial exchange. While the latter is also arguably in essence mere convention, it certainly presents itself as a natural fact, reinforced by legislation as well as morality. As an economic act conducted in hope or expectation rather than certainty, the gift, or indeed the sacrifice as a kind of gift to the gods, undoes an exchange logic of guaranteed return. This may then be a way out of the ‘système fermé’ of tightly regulated capitalist logic. Neither gift nor sacrifice necessarily entails, or pretends to necessarily entail, the ends for which they are performed. The object of gift exchange, as Bataille goes on to articulate in La Part maudite, retains the possibility of non-recuperation into a logic of equivalence and is not therefore reduced to ‘l’inertie’ and ‘l’absence de vie du monde profane’; instead it exhibits ‘le rayonnement de la gloire’. 193 The gift and the sacrifice could thus potentially embody the liberation of matter, human and non-human, ‘dont l’essence est de consumer sans profit ce qui pourrait rester dans l’enchaînement des œuvres utiles.’194 For Bataille, potlatch itself, in the squandering rather than hoarding of wealth, builds towards the possibility of breaking that cycle of useful endeavour; its ultimate expression would be that ‘un potlatch ne pût être rendu’, that one would effectively ‘win’ the game of giving and receiving.195 This would also be the ultimate expression of expenditure; a gift that was unanswerable, unconditional, a gift so generous and absolute as to constitute a loss and waste to which no response would be possible. A sovereign gift, a sacrifice so extreme that it would make a return actually impossible. A gift that, as Comay puts it, ‘would tolerate no return – no payment, no feedback, no profit, however secret – a giving which would exceed every circuit of compensation’. And reason itself, being built on the principle of ‘rational’ or ‘just’ exchange, of sense, logic and adequation, would be ‘shattered’ by such a gift.196 Such giving would also be, in its total defiance of expectation, unbound from future consequences. The impossibility of response severs the causal chain between the gift itself and whatever may sequentially follow it. The future thus recedes into darkness, and the restrictions of futurity are blown open.

#### Decline maintains deterrence while preventing aggression.

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Paul MacDonald and Joseph Parent, 2018, “Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and Retrenchment”, Cornell University Press

Fourth and most important, declining powers can redistribute resources to bolster deterrence at select strongpoints. If retrenchment were simply a negative process, then declining powers would do nothing but retreat. Yet declining powers often use retrenchment to shuffle resources amongst commitments, placing priority on defending vital interests. The underlying strategy here is strongpoint defense. 37 Rather than fritter away forces maintaining a sprawling and fragile perimeter, great powers can focus on protecting crucial commitments closer to home. When capabilities are concentrated, a great power will be able to respond to potential provocations from a position of strength. Furthermore, because a great power is focused on core interests, the credibility of its security guarantees will be amplified: adversaries will understand which interests a declining power values and be more likely to believe it will pay the price to defend them. Cutting the number of commitments also simplifies the strategic challenge facing declining powers: they have fewer potential adversaries to monitor, can more easily shift resources from one brushfi re to another, and can more rapidly capitalize on fluid situations and adversaries’ missteps. Retrenchment is a Fabian strategy designed to outlast rising challengers.

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### Conditionality---2NC